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Abstract: High initial income inequality is correlated 
with slow per capita GNP growth in a cross section of 
countries. There are many theoretical explanations of 
this pattern each of which suggests that the correlation 
should be eliminated when additional explanatory 
variables are added to the regression. This paper 
reports only weak evidence for each of the theories 
considered. On the other hand it is noted that the 
correlation of income inequality with slow growth in the 
1980s is much more negative that the correlation with 
growth in the 1960s and 1970s and that this correlation 
is strikingly reduced when an indicator variable for 
rescheduling of debt repayment is included in the 
regression. This paper suggests that unequal income 
distribution is correlated with slow growth because it 
is correlated with difficulties in debt repayment in the 
1980s. This suggests a causal connection which has 
received relatively little emphasis in the theoretical 
literature.
I would like to thank Lucrezia Reichlin, Christian Morisson and 
other participants at the European Workshop on Recent 
Developments in Econometrics and Economic Theory : Growth and 






















































































































































































This paper explores the association between income 
inequality and per capita GDP growth from 1960 to 1985 in a cross 
section of 54 countries. As is now well known (Persson and 
Tabellini 1991 and Alesina and Rodrik 1991) an unequal income 
distribution is associated with slow economic growth. There are 
a large number of different theoretical explanations for this 
association. Some theories assert that the association is due 
to a true causal relation as inequality causes some proximate 
cause of slow growth such as low investment in physical or human 
capital. Other theories assert that the relationship is spurious 
as some third factor, the true cause of slow growth also causes 
unequal income distribution. The implications of the two types 
of theories are, of course very different. However the same 
extremely simple technique can be used to evaluate competing 
theories. Each theory suggests that the addition of a new 
explanatory variable will eliminate the partial correlation 
between income inequality and slow growth. This paper uses the 
rich data set accumulated by Barro and Wolf (1989) and the World 
Bank's Social Indicators of Development (1992) as sources for 
additional explanatory variables.
The results of this simple empirical investigation are not 
especially decisive. Each of the many additional variables 
explains a small fraction of the association between income 
distribution and growth, but the effects are small and 
statistically insignificant. The conclusion is that there might 
be something to each or to every theory, but that the data do not 
firmly suggest which. This is not really surprising given the 
small sample, the poor data quality, the many omitted variables, 
and the fact that the available data correspond only loosely to 
the variables associated with inequality and growth according to 
the various theories.
There is, however, an extremely striking feature of the data 
which has not, to my knowledge, been noted, and which is firmly 
implied by only a small subset of the theories. A 




























































































income distribution on economic growth is caused by the extremely 
low growth in the 1980s of countries with unequal income 
distribution (measured in the late 50s or early 60s)
Depending on which additional variables are included in the 
regression, one half to two thirds of the apparent effect of 
inequality on__growth is due to growth in 5 of 25 years. If 
growth from 1960 to 1980 is considered, the apparent negative 
effect of income inequality is small, statistically insignificant 
and driven to zero by a wide variety of proposed additional 
explanatory variables. The data tell two different stories one 
for the 60s and 70s and the other for the early 80s.
What was different about the 80s ? Two possibilities spring 
to mind. First the price of oil rose in the 70s and fell in the 
80s so the relative performance of OPEC countries declined 
sharply. This explanation of the change from the 60s and 70s to 
the 80s clearly has some empirical importance, however the 
difference in the apparent effect of income inequality on 
economic growth in the 80s and before remains statistically and 
economically significant when a dummy variable for OPEC member 
is included. Second real interest rates rose and many debtor 
countries experienced extreme economic difficulties. As noted 
by Berg and Sachs (1988), countries with unequal income 
distributions had higher debt export ratios in 1981 and were more 
likely to reschedule debt repayment. The importance of this root 
from inequality to slow growth is demonstrated by the striking 
decrease in the coefficient of per capita GDP growth on a measure 
of inequality when the debt burden in 1981 or a dummy variable 
for rescheduled debt payments is included in the regression.
The patterns noted above indicate the importance of the 
connection between inequality and foreign indebtedness predicted 
by Alesina and Tabellini (1988) and noted by Berg and Sachs 
(1988) and Ozler and Tabellini (1991). This does not cast much 
doubt on the many other theories of why inequality is bad forfLr^W 
growth. Each of them can be modified with the additional 
argument that many developing countries borrowed heavily in the 
70s and only those which developed successfully were able to 




























































































in this paper is that international lending enabled countries 
with unequal income distribution and unhealthy economies to 
obscure the second of these problems until the debt crisis 
occurred.
This analysis suggests that theories which connect income 
inequality to heavy foreign borrowing and to difficulties with 
repayment are empirically important. It casts relatively little 
light on the wide variety of other theories which attempt to 
explain why inequality is associated with slow growth.
This paper is divided into six sections the first of which 
is this introduction. The second sketches several theoretical 
explanations of the association between inequality and slow 
growth. The third describes the data used. The fourth describes 
the specification and some test statistics. The fifth describes 
the empirical results. The sixth draws conclusions.
II Review of Theories and Their Empirical Implications
In this section I will briefly discuss eight different 
explanations for the negative association of inequality and 
growth. I will suggest empirical implications of each 
explanation. For convenience I will give each explanation a 
brief title indicated in CAPITAL letters.
Among the leading theories seeking to explain why inequality 
two closely related theories which suggest 
is efforts to reduce income inequality by 
Persson and Tabellini and Alesina and 
Rodrik each note that less equal income distribution implies that 
the median household receives larger benefits from simple re­
distributive policies. They appeal to a median voter model to 
predict that re-distributive taxes and transfers will be greater 
if income is distributed less equally. Then they note that in 
an economy characterized by endogenous growth this will slow 
economic growth if the taxes reduce incentives to accumulate the 
engine of growth -- respectively human and physical capital. The 
reader is referred to Persson and Tabellini (1991) and to Alesina 
and Rodrik (1991) for a presentation of the models. Each draws
is bad for growth are 



























































































and tests the same implication of the model. Since the theories 
rely on a model of voting it applies to democracies and not to 
dictatorships. In fact each finds a larger effect of inequality 
on growth in democracies than in dictatorships. However neither 
paper presents data which can reject the hypothesis that the 
effects of inequality on growth rates are equal in the two sub­
samples. Indeed Persson and Tabellini express confidence in the 
basic relationship between income inequality and growth and much 
less confidence in their particular theory.
Each theory suggests other predictions which are in 
principal testable. First each predicts that the negative effect 
of inequality on growth can be explained with direct measurement 
of investment in the engine of growth. In the ALESINA AND RODRIK 
model this is simply investment, for the PERSSON AND TABELLINI 
model this is investment in human capital which can be measured, 
albeit very poorly, by formal schooling. In each case a striking 
effect of including the additional variable on the association 
between income inequality and growth has an ambiguous 
interpretation. Rapid growth can increase investment in physical 
human capital by increasing the returns on human and physical 
capital. Also each model, taken literally, suggests that the 
association between inequality and slow growth would be 
eliminated if re-distributive policies were measured directly and 
included as explanatory variables.
A slightly less rigorous interpretation of the theories 
leads to different predictions. Taxes and transfers are only one 
effect of a struggle over income distribution and arguably are 
the least damaging for growth. A casual reinterpretation of each 
model suggests that inequality leads to slow growth by increasing 
the intensity:, of distributional struggle. This might occur in 
dictatorships as well as in democracies and might not lead to 
victory for the poor or egalitarian. This informal POLITICAL 
CONFLICT argument suggests that the association between income 
inequality and slow growth might be explained by inclusion of 
indicators of "distributional conflict" such as the number o7 





























































































A story with empirical implications very similar to Persson 
and Tabellini's model, but with rather different policy 
implications is as follows. First education is the engine of 
growth as is suggested by the work of Barro (1991). However, 
investment in formal education is the result of public policy as 
well as individual choice, since formal education is heavily 
subsidized. The PUBLIC EDUCATION argument follows. Assume 
governments in different countries subsidize education to 
different degrees. High subsidies to education cause high 
enrollment. This increases economic growth. high enrollment 
also drives down the return to education and reduces income 
inequality. This final step seems^bold)but it is supported by 
the evidence that returns to schooling different countries are 
highly correlated with income inequality and that they explain 
(in a purely statistical sense) a large fraction of differences 
in inequality (Tilak 1989). Furthermore, swings in income 
inequality in Columbia are largely explained by swings in returns 
to formal education, which are, in turn, explained by a sharp 
increase in public spending on education in the early 50s 
(Londono 1990).
In this PUBLIC EDUCATION story the income distribution does 
not result from exogenous differences in native ability as it 
does in the Persson and Tabellini model. In contrast the level 
of education is determined by exogenous (or not modelled) public 
choices. If true it suggests that slow growth and inequality are 
caused by the absence of a particular kind of re-distributive 
policy. The implications of Persson and Tabellini's model and 
the sketch of a model described above are very similar, but no 
connection between democracy and the effect of inequality on 
growth is implied by the second.
There are also DEMAND SIDE explanations of the effect of 
inequality on growth. Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989), 
Baldwin (1956), Harbison (1970), North (1959) and Rosenberg 
(1972) argue that the rich demand services, hand made luxuries 
and imports, while the non-rich demand domestically produced 
manufactured goods. If manufacturing is characterized by 




























































































association between income inequality and economic growth. This 
suggests that the share of industry in GDP or in labour demand 
might explain the association of inequality and slow growth.
A modified version of the theory has a clearer implication 
if one considers the sort of services the rich might demand. In 
particular concentration of wealth increase incomes to lawyers, 
flatterers, courtiers and rent seekers generally compared to the 
incomes of those with skills in producing wealth e.g. engineers. 
Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1991) assert that a high ratio of 
engineers to lawyers is correlated with rapid growth. This 
TALENT ALLOCATION model suggests that the inclusion of the 
fraction of tertiary degrees in engineering and natural science 
should help to explain the correlation of inequality and slow 
growth. It is worth noting (especially before an audience of 
social scientists) that the alternative may not be self 
interested rent seeking and that e.g. intense political struggle 
might also attract educated people away from engineering.
Rent seeking (and political conflict) models suggest that 
abundant UNPRODUCED WEALTH (e.g. land, oil, minerals) is a mixed 
(blessing. Struggles over the control of such wealth might 
distract effort from wealth creation and reduce growth. If the 
control of unproduced wealth is typically less equally 
distributed than other sources of income such as labour or human 
capital, this could explain the correlation of inequality and 
slow growth. One does not have to appeal to rent seeking or 
distributional conflict to explain such a result however. If 
e.g. land contributes to national income, but contributes less 
than e.g. knowledge to economic growth, nations with abundant 
unproduced wealth might have slow economic growth. This argument 
involves no theory at all and follows if wealth from land adds 
an equal amount to the numerator and denominator of e.g. per 
capita GDP in 1985 divided by per capita GDP in 1960. If 
ownership of unproduced wealth is less equally distributed than 
human capital, the amount of unproduced wealth should explain the 




























































































A similarly uninteresting explanation is DEMOGRAPHIC.
Across countries an unequal income distribution is correlated 
with high fertility (Heerink 1991). Rapid population growth is 
correlated with slow growth of per capita GDP. Therefore 
inequality is correlated with slow growth. Unlike the theories 
above this argument is strictly empirical, and indeed known to 
be true. The only question is how much of the empirical pattern 
is explained in this way. ill
Finally each of the models which predict slow growth suggest 
that countries with unequal income distributions might experience 
difficulty repaying foreign debts. In addition, as explained by 
Alesina and Tabellini (1988) and Ozler and Tabellini (1991) 
political instability and sharp differences in priorities of 
'^competing parties may increase external indebtedness. An 
informal version of their argument is that if there is a high 
chance of a new government with very different aims taking power, 
the current government will benefit from reducing the new 
government's ability to spend by borrowing up to the liquidity 
constraint. If income inequality is associated with political 
instability and sharp ideological conflict, it should be 
correlated with external indebtedness and poor growth performance 
in the 80s. Finally as argued informally by (Berg and Sachs) the 
rich a relatively able to avoid capital controls and taxes by 0? 
sending their money abroad. Capital flight is known or at least 
universally believed to have contributed to the debt crisis. 
According to the DEBT CRISIS explanation, the negative effects 
of inequality on growth should be concentrated in the 1980s and 
explained by debt export ratios and an indicator variable 
indicating that the country in question rescheduled debt 
repayment.
The models, explanations, and informal arguments above are 
listed below with empirical implications. When additional 
explanatory variables are listed without explanation, the 
implication is that inclusion of such variables in a regression 
explaining per capita GDP growth will drive the coefficient on 




























































































Persson and Tabellini education, government taxes and 
transfers. Effect should be seen 
only in democracies.
Alesina and Rodrik Investment/GDP, government taxes and 
transfers. Effect should be seen 
only in democracies.
Political Conflict Strikes, Riots, Revolutions and Coups
Public Education Education. Effect should be seen in 
dictatorships.
Demand Side percent employment in Industry
Talent Allocation Fraction of tertiary students in 
science and engineering. Unproduced 
Wealth
Unproduced Wealth Population per square Kilometer of 
agricultural land.
Demographic Growth of population over same years 
as growth of GDP.
Debt Crisis Reschedule, Debt Export ratio in 
1981. The effect should be 
concentrated in the 1980s.
III Data
Data on income distribution are available for many fewer 
countries than data on economic growth or the other covariates. 
Furthermore income distribution data for different countries are 
often not comparable even when assembled by the same organization 
such as the World Bank of U.N.. In this paper I use data on the 




























































































(1973). This data set has some key advantages. First the data 
are old reducing problems with simultaneity. For 43 of 54 
countries the data were collected before 1965. Second all refer 
to pre-tax income. Since endogenous tax rates are the key 
feature of the Persson-Tabellini and Alesina-Rodrik theories this 
is crucial. Finally while Paukert asserts no more than that the 
distribution data refer "mostly" to the distribution of income 
across households, experts in the field consider his data set 
less contaminated than other sources of old income distribution 
data by incomparable data on e.g. the distribution of income 
across income recipients or the distribution of wages (Robert 
Summers personal communication). A weak point of his data set 
is that data are collected at different times for different 
countries. For 41 of the 54 between 1955 and 1965 and for 39 
between 1956 and 1964. I have explored the possible biases this 
introduces in the results by including the year the data were 
collected as an additional explanatory variable without 
noticeable effect on the results (results not shown). An expert 
on income distribution data informed me that the income 
distribution reported by Paukert for Germany and Morocco are 
inaccurate (C. Morisson personal communication) these data points 
are excluded from all calculations including summary statistics. 
If Germany and Morocco are included the apparent effect of 
inequality on growth is slightly higher and more difficult to 
explain.
Since different measures of inequality are highly 
correlated, finding which measure is most (negatively) correlated 
with growth is not a fruitful approach to choosing among the 
theories. I have focused on the share of income of the richest 
5% of households. To reduce the risk that the results are driven 
by outliers'll use the log of the income share of the richest 5% 
(logrich). Some exploration of different measures is presented 
below. Table 1 presents the share of the riches 5% and the year 
in which the data were collected for the sample of 54 countries.
Data on per capita real GDP at international prices are 
obtained from Heston and Summers (1988). Data on debt export 




























































































debt repayment were obtained from Berg and Sachs (1988). All 
other data were obtained either from Social Indicators of 
Development (IBRD 1992) or from the data appendix assembled by 
Barro and Wolf (1989) as used and described in Barro (1991). 
Definitions and original sources are described in a data appendix 
(itself a modified version of Barro and Wolf's data appendix). 
Summary statistics for all variables are presented in table II.
IV Specification and Statistical Tests
The approach used in this paper is very simple. Most 
results are reported for OLS estimated across countries as in 
equation 1 )
1) gr6085 = c + £logrich + a + E
where gr6085 is the rate of growth of real per capital GNP from 
1960 to 1985, c is a constant, logrich is the log of the income 
share of the richest 5% of households, and .Z is a vector of 
additional variables as suggested by different theories. Each 
theory predicts that the addition of some Z variables will drive 
£ towards zero.
I use three statistical techniques to evaluate whether the 
addition of a variable drives £ towards zero. First, under the 
assumption that the additional variable is exogenous, I can test 
the hypothesis that £ is zero with a standard t-test. This 
tests the theory which suggests addition of Z and thus the 
hypothesis that the proposed causal connection is the only true 
causal connection. In each case it the null hypothesis is 
implausible. First it is likely that several of the proposed 
causal paths contribute to the raw correlation, and second 
because the Z variables are often crude proxies for the variables 
of interest. Nonetheless, The null hypothesis is almost never 
rejected using per capita GDP growth from 1960 to 1985 as the 
dependent variable. Given the small sample and resulting low 
power of the tests this is not interesting. It is more 




























































































significantly, that is to test the null that the expected value 
of estimates of & estimated with different specifications are the 
same.
To do this I use a Wald statistic which is asymptotically 
distributed N(0,1) and is described by equation 2
2 ) statistic = (£x - fejl/VfvarSj + varE, +2cov(£x,£3) )
Where and £j are estimates of £ using different
specifications.
This tests the hypothesis that the proposed causal 
connection does not exist at all. Again the null hypothesis is 
rarely rejected.
Since diametrically opposite null-hypotheses are generally 
not rejected one could conclude that the whole exercise is 
futile. One might also interpret the point estimates with 
caution recognizing the large standard errors. In addition to 
the point estimate itself, it is useful to compare the success 
'gf additional variables in explaining per capita GDP growth and 
in explaining £ that is driving £ towards zero. In particular 
this is useful if Z variables e.g. enrollment rates capture only 
part of differences in the variable of interest e.g. human 
capital accumulation. If Z is a poor measure of the variable of 
interest it will have a small effect on £ and a small effect on 
the R2 of the regression. These effects are compared by 
reporting the ratio of the coefficient to the standard error of 
the regression S. This statistic is generally constant with two 
exceptions. It is easy to interpret this. If e.g. the
correlation of logrich with measured and unmeasured human capital 
accumulation are equal a constant £/S implies that human capital 
accumulation explains all of the correlation of inequality and 
growth if it explains all of differences in growth rates across 
countries. Since it is generally agreed that none of the
variables considered is the sole source of growth, I consider a 
constant ratio £/S to suggest that the theory in question is 
incomplete. This is not a test of a hypothesis but rather a 
statistic and, as noted above, the data generally do not reject 





























































































First the raw correlation between logrich and gr6085 is 
negative and significant with correlation coefficient of 0.34 and 
a t-statistic of -2.57 as reported in column 1 of table III. The 
regression coefficient is -1.75 which suggests that at the sample 
arithmetic mean of the income share of the rich 26.6 an 
additional 1 % of income going to the rich would reduce per capita 
GDP growth by 0.066 % each year which would imply real GDP 1.64 
% lower in 1985. A one standard error increase in logrich is 
correlated with real gdp growth lower by 0.63 % per year. This 
is similar to the results of Persson and Tabellini and of Alesina 
and Rodrik and suggests that the differences in income 
distribution data and specification are not crucial.
Column two of table III reports the very small effect of 
adding the log of per capita real GDP in 1960. This is included 
to control for possible convergence. There is no evidence of 
convergence in this regression without additional explanatory 
variables. The coefficient on the log of per capita real GDP in 
1960 is extremely sensitive to further addition of explanatory 
variables.
Column three of table III includes the annual population 
growth rate from 1960 to 1985. The point estimate of -0.82 
suggests that additional people add almost nothing to production. 
Again this coefficient is strongly affected by additional 
explanatory variables. More importantly, the inclusion of the 
population growth rate has a noticeable effect on the coefficient 
on logrich which falls by approximately two thirds of a standard 
error. The t-statistic on logrich falls to 1.55, it is not 
possible to reject the hypothesis that inequality is correlated 
with slow per capita GDP growth only because it is correlated 
with rapid population growth. However it is also not possible 
to reject the hypothesis that the true coefficients with and 
without the population growth rate are the same. These results 
lend some support to the demographic explanation, and casts doubt 
on empirical work which excludes population growth.




























































































by the addition of the percent of workers employed in industry 
in 1965.
3)gr6085 = c + Slogrich +a1lgdp60 +(X2gpop6085 +(*3Slind65 +e
where lgdp60 is the log of per real per capita GDp in 1960. 
gpop6085 is the growth rate of population from 1960 to 1985 and 
Slind65 is the percent of workers employed in industry in 1965. 
The coefficient on Slind65 is expected to be positive as output 
of industry has grown more quickly than output of agriculture or 
services. In fact the coefficient is significant and positive. 
The inclusion of the percent of workers employed in industry has 
almost no effect on the coefficient on logrich casting some doubt 
on the demand side explanation. However percent of workers 
employed in industry is strongly negatively correlated witty 
population growth and it is difficult to disentangle the two 
effects. The coefficient on logrich is similar if the percent 
of workers employed in industry is included and the population 
growth rate is excluded (results not shown).
The public education argument and the Persson and Tabellini 
model suggest that the negative correlation of inequality on 
growth can be explained if human capital investment is included 
as an explanatory variable. Column 5 of table III reports the 
effect of including the primary school enrollment rate in 1970 
and the secondary school enrollment rate in 1970. The two 
variables are of course collinear, but the primary school 
enrollment rate is still strongly statistically significant. The 
R2 jumps from 0.29 to 0.61 implying an F(2,47) statistic of 
17.78 . Nonetheless the coefficient on logrich is -0.88 so it
is reduced by only about one third of a standard error. This 
reflects the surprising fact that, once per capita GDP and the 
population growth rate are included, income inequality is not 
associated with low primary school enrollment. The ratio of the 
coefficient to the standard error of the regression rises 
slightly. If the point estimate is taken literally and it is 
assumed that the correlation of logrich with measured and 




























































































for differences in human capital accumulation to explain the 
association of inequality with slow growth, differences in human 
capital accumulation would have to explain all of the variance 
in per capita GDP growth rates. It is quite difficult to 
reconcile this result with the public education explanation. 
Since school enrollment is perhaps a poor measure of human 
capital accumulation, the result could be reconciled with the 
Persson and Tabellini model. However it is difficult to explain 
why primary school enrollment should be such an excellent 
explanatory variable if it is poorly correlated with true human 
capital accumulation.
Column six of table III reports the virtually identical 
results obtained when enrollment in 1960 is used instead of 
enrollment in 1970. A Similar effect on the coefficient on 
logrich occurs when the student teacher ratio in primary and in 
secondary school are added to the regressions (results not 
shown). Similarly little effect occurs when the ratio of nominal 
government spending on education to nominal GDP averaged over 
1970 to 1985 was used as an indicator of investment in human 
capital (results not shown)
In order to get some indication of the importance .jjf 
political conflict in economic growth, the number of politically 
motivated strikes per year, riots per year and revolutions plus 
coups per year were included as additional explanatory variables. 
Only revolutions plus coups per year had a significantly 
negatively coefficient. The additional explanatory variables had 
almost no effect on the coefficient on logrich. This casts some 
doubt on the importance of the political conflict explanation. 
Of course the variables used are a poor measures of political 
conflict.
Finally the real investment in real GDP averaged over 1960 
to 1985 was included as an additional explanatory variable. As 
expected it is positively associated with real per capita GDP 
growth. Again the effect on the coefficient on logrich is fairly 
small. The coefficient changes from -0.96 to -0.67 about one 
half of a standard error.




























































































results may be partially caused by simultaneous equations bias. 
Any multiplier effects and/or capital mobility imply that 
positive shocks to growth cause high investment. This biases the 
coefficient on investment up and, given the negative partial 
correlation between inequality and investment, biases the 
coefficient on logrich up towards zero. In order to evaluate the 
importance of this problem I used the ratio of real investment 
to real GDP in 1960 which should not be (as strongly) affected 
by shocks to economic growth from 1960 to 1985. As expected the 
explanatory power of investment in 1960 is less than that of 
investment averaged over 1960 to 1985. The inclusion of the 
ratio of investment to GDP in 1960 actually increases the 
magnitude of the coefficient on logrich to -1.14.
Many of the OLS regressions reported in this paper are 
potentially effected by simultaneous equations bias. In each 
case this bias would lead to increased apparent success in 
explaining the association of income inequality and growth.
These results provide almost no evidence for the Alesina and 
Rodrik model and suggest that their explanation is not very 
important.
In order to test the allocation of talent model the percent 
of tertiary students concentrating in natural sciences and 
engineering in 1970 (sci70) and in 1980 (sci80) were included in 
separate regressions along with the other variables which were 
found above to be statistically significant. Since these data 
are available for only 43 and 37 of the 54 countries respectively 
additional regressions with the reduced sample but not including 
sci70 or sci80 were estimated. Oddly, with the small sample for 
which both allocation of talent and income distribution data were 
available, the coefficients on sci70 and on sci80 were negative 
(for the whole sample for which data were available the 
coefficients were positive but not statistically significant). 
The coefficients on logrich actually increased marginally when 
sci70 or sci80 were added to the regression (results not shown). 
There is no evidence in this data set that the negative 
association between inequality and growth is caused by the effect 




























































































In a relatively direct approach to testing the Alesina and 
Rodrik and Persson and Tabellini theories, I attempt to include 
direct measures of the extent of government redistributive 
policies; the share of nominal government social insurance and 
welfare payments to nominal GDP (SOCSEC) Socsec is available for 
only 40 countries so a regression with the basic specification 
and the reduced sample are reported for comparison. The 
coefficient on logrich is actually increased slightly. Socsec 
is not significantly negatively associated with growth. Results 
are reported in table IV. The effort to find direct evidence that 
inequality is associated with slow growth because it is 
positively associated with government redistributive policies is 
completely unsuccessful. In order to test the unproduced 
wealth explanation the basic specification —  equation 3 -- was 
re-estimated with the percent of workers in industry in 1965 
replaced by the percent of workers in agriculture in 1965. This 
caused a small reduction in the coefficient on logrich as 
reported in column two of table IV (results from a regression 
excluding the percent of workers in agriculture are reported in 
column one of table IV for comparison since the sample size is 
reduced by one). Finally, the log of the ratio of population to 
arable land in 1965 was added. The additional variable has 
large but imprecisely estimated positive coefficient. Inclusion 
reduces the coefficient on logrich to -0 . 2 1 with a t-statistic 
of -0.29 as is reported in column two of table IV. The negative 
association between income inequality and per capita GDP growth 
from 1960 to 1985 is essentially completely explained by the 
positive correlation of inequality and rapid population growth 
and a large role of agriculture in GDP in 1960. The null 
hypothesis that the expected values of the coefficients on 
logrich from this regression and from the simple regression with 
the same sample are the same is rejected by the data -- the 
difference is 2.63 times its standard error.
The striking effect of including the log of the ratio of 
population to agricultural land suggests that unproduced wealth 
is a mixed blessing as it diverts energies from productive 




























































































reflects the fact that land was a more important source of 
national income in 1960 than in 1985.
In any case it is disturbing that this variable is rarely 
used in the large comparative growth literature. It seems 
possible that, like the association of inequality and slow 
growth, many patterns in the data are the result of omitting this 
variable. It is also disturbing that the effect of Ladens65 on 
the coefficient on logrich is very small when Germany and Morocco 
are included in the regression (results not shown). This simply 
shows that with a small sample apparently statistically robust 
results can be created, or in this case eliminated, by one or two 
outliers.
In summary with one to three exceptions the additional 
explanatory variables which the various theories surveyed suggest 
should explain the association of income inequality and slow 
growth had only a small to tiny effect on the coefficient of 
interest. The exceptions are the rate of growth of population, 
the percent of workers employed in agriculture and especially the 
log of the ratio of population to agricultural land. This lends 
some support to the demographic explanation and to the unproduced 
wealth explanation.
The results of this exercise are difficult to interpret for 
at least three reasons. First the explanatory variables are 
often extremely poor measures of the phenomenon of interest e.g. 
political conflict. Second it is always impossible to reject the 
alternative hypothesis. The fact that the data do not 
demonstrate that the coefficient on the share of the rich are 
different when e.g. investment is or is not included in the 
regression does not mean that they are the same. Third the 
association to be explained is to weak to be convincingly 
reduced. In none of the regressions which include the population 
growth rate, is the coefficient on logrich statistically 
significant. This makes it difficult for any variable to cause 
a striking reduction in the magnitude of the coefficient. Given 
the large point estimate of the effect of inequality on growth 
this quite probably reflects the small sample size and poor data 




























































































small to be worth explaining. In any case little evidence for 
any of the theories but the demographic theory and the unproduced 
wealth theory is present in this data set.
The additional variables generally reduce the coefficient 
on Logrich approximately as predicted. This can be interpreted 
as implying that there each is true and each theory explains part 
of the association of inequality with slow growth. However this 
reduction is principally achieved by the inclusion of variables 
which have received little attention from theorists -- the growth 
rate of population and the ratio of population to agricultural 
land. The theoretically motivated addition of other variables 
reduces the coefficient on Logrich by at most 0.29 or less than 
one half of its standard error.
The results reported in tables III and IV suggest that the 
association between inequality and growth is due to the 
correlation of inequality and rapid population growth and large 
amounts of agricultural land per capita. This impression is 
shown -to be false when economic growth from 1960 to 1980 is 
separated from economic growth from 1980 to 1985. Column one of 
Table V reports the coefficient on Logrich from the simple 
regression of the annual rate of growth of per capita GDP from 
1980 to 1985 (gr8085) on logrich. The Correlation coefficient 
is 0.26 and the regression coefficient is -4.48, two and one half 
times as large as the coefficient estimated with growth from 1960 
to 1985. This means that half of the apparent effect of 
inequality on growth from 1960 to 1985 is achieved in the 1980s. 
This striking fact is easily explained by the debt crisis theory, 
but not by any of the other theories. The change in the 
coefficient on logrich is statistically significant at the 5% 
level as is demonstrated by a regression of the difference of the 
two growth rates on logrich which gives a t-statistic of -3.31. 
Table V reports the coefficients of the growth rate of real per 
capita GDP from 1980 to 1985 and from 1960 to 1980 and of the 
difference of the two growth rates. In column one the 
coefficients from simple regressions are reported.
Column two of table V reports the fact that the addition of 




























































































from 1960 to 1985, and the percent of workers employed in 
industry has almost no effect on the difference in the 
coefficients or the t-statistic of the difference. The 
difference in the two periods becomes much more striking as the 
ratio of the coefficients on Logrich estimated with the two 
different periods increases to 12.69. If taken literally this 
would imply that three fourths of the effect of inequality on 
growth over the whole period occurred from 1980 to 1985.
One obvious and uninteresting explanation of the change is 
that oil exporters have unequal income distributions and 
experienced high growth in the 70s and low growth in the 80s. 
As is reported in column 3 of table V the inclusion of an 
indicator variable for members of OPEC in addition to the 
variables used in the regression reported in column 2 does reduce 
the difference between the coefficients and the t-statistic. The 
test statistics remain significant at the 5% level however.
In contrast when additional indicator variables for Latin 
America and for Africa reduces the coefficient of gr8085 on 
logrich in half (or roughly two standard errors) . The t- 
statistic becomes statistically insignificant. Indeed when only 
the indicator variables are included in the regression the 
coefficient of gr8085 on logrich is small and not statistically 
significantly greater than the coefficient of gr6080 on logrich.
The most striking feature of this data set is that Latin 
American countries, African countries and OPEC members have 
unequal income distributions and experienced slow economic growth 
from 1980 to 1985. The poor growth of OPEC countries in the 
early 80s has an obvious explanation. The poor growth of Latin 
American and African countries in the early 80s suggests that 
differences in experience of the debt crisis by countries with 
equal and unequal income distributions is an important part of 
the association of inequality and slow growth.
In the results reported above I used data from the whole 
sample or from 1960 to explain growth from 1980 to 1985 or to 
explain growth from 1960 to 1980. This made it easier to compare 
the two periods. Table VI reports the small effect of additional 




























































































growth from 1980 to 1985. The effects on the coefficient on 
logrich of adding explanatory variables analogous to those used 
regressions reported in table III and IV are small. This is 
problematic for theories other than the debt crisis theory.
A more direct test of the importance of the debt crisis in 
contributing to the association between inequality and slow 
growth is provided by including debt related variables in 
regressions explaining growth in the 80s. Berg and Sachs use a 
small cross sectional data base to demonstrate the strong 
association between income inequality and the debt export ratio 
in 1981 and between inequality and the rescheduling debt 
repayments (Berg and Sachs). Since a heavy debt burden and 
rescheduling debts are correlated with slow growth in the early 
80s, the association between inequality and debt or rescheduled 
payments must help explain the association between inequality and 
slow growth. Columns 5 and 6 of table VII demonstrate the 
striking reduction of the coefficient on logrich caused by the 
inclusion of an indicator variable for rescheduled debt 
repayment. The coefficient fall roughly by half that is by 
approximately 1.4 standard errors. The null hypothesis that the 
expected values of the coefficients are equal is rejected against 
the one sided alternative that including the indicator variable 
reduces the coefficient since the test statistic is 2.02. Note 
that information on rescheduling (obtained from Berg and Sachs) 
was available along with income distribution data for only 18 
countries. Column 4 reports the simple regression of gr8085 on 
logrich estimated with the reduced sample for comparison. Column 
6 of table VII reports the similarly striking effect of including 
the debt export ratio in 1981. Table VII demonstrates the 
empirical importance of difficulties with debt in accounting for 
the association between inequality and slow growth.
V Conclusions
This paper has discussed a large variety of potential 
explanations for the fact that countries with unequal income 




























































































of the explanations suggests that the addition of explanatory 
variables measuring the proximate or root cause of slow economic 
growth would drive the apparent effect of inequality to zero. 
An extensive investigation along these lines finds modest to 
nonexistent evidence for all of the theories discussed with three 
striking exceptions.
An unequal distribution of income is correlated with_rapid 
population growth which is correlated with slow per capita GDP 
growth. Each of these fact has been widely noted in the 
literature, and the result was known in advance. This paper 
simply provides an additional warning that population growth 
rates should not be ignored when attempting to explain 
differences in economic growth.
A low ratio of population to agricultural land is correlated 
with slow economic growth and with an unequal income 
distribution. These correlations are strong enough to eliminate 
the negative partial correlation of inequality and per capita GDP 
growth from 1960 to 1985. Again no interesting theory is needed 
to explain this stylized fact. The negative correlation land per 
capita and economic growth can be explained if land contributes 
a relatively constant amount to GDP and therefore proportionally 
more to per capita GDP in 1960 than in 1985. The positive 
correlation of land per capita and inequality can be explained 
if ownership of land is less equally distributed than ownership 
of other factors of production. While this explanation is not 
especially interesting, its apparent empirical significance means 
that it can not be ignored.
The strong association between inequality and difficulty 
with debt repayment in the early 1980s and the strong association 
between such difficulty and slow growth provides an explanation 
for the association between inequality and growth in at least an 
accounting sense. One can interpret this as simply implying that 
countries with unequal income distributions chose to postpone 
inevitable economic costs by borrowing. If one does so the lack 
of success in explaining the association between inequality and 
slow growth over the entire period remains problematic. The 




























































































until the overall results are consistent with the view that each 
theory is true and the overall pattern is the result of the 
combination of many different effects. However the striking 
pattern of a weak association in the 60s and 70s and a strong 
association in the 80s largely accounted for by difficulties with 
debt repayment suggests that more attention should be focused on 
theories which predict specifically that countries with unequal 
income distribution accumulate heavy foreign debts and have 
difficulty repaying those debts.
Such theories emphasize the advantage of borrowing up to the 
maximum allowed by creditors if governments with sharply 
different aims alternate in power (Alesina and Tabellini 1988, 
Ozler and Tabellini 1991) or emphasize the opportunity and strong 
incentives which enable the rich to transfer their wealth abroad 
(Berg and Sachs 1988). The results of this paper suggest that 
such phenomena deserve more attention from economists attempting 
to understand the connection between inequality and economic 
growth and indeed from economists attempting to understand 





























































































Alesina, A and Rodrik D (1991) "Distributive Politics and 
Economic Growth," NBER working paper No. 3668.
Alesina, A and Tabellini, G (1988) “External Debt, Capital 
Flight, and Political Risk," NBER working paper No. 2610.
Berg, A and Sachs, J (1988) “The Debt Crisis: Structural
Explanations of Country Performance,“ NBER working paper No. 
2607.
Barro, R (1991) "Economic Growth in a Cross Section of 
Countries," Quarterly Journal of Economics vol 106 pp 407-443.
Barro, R and Wolf H (1989) “Data Appendix for Economic Growth in 
a Cross Section of Countries," by Robert Barro and Holger Wolf. 
Data on Diskette (Cambridge:National Bureau of Economic 
Research).
Baldwin, R E (1956) “Patterns of Development in Newly Settled 
Regions," The Manchester School vol 24 pp 161-179.
Harbison, R W (1970) "Columbia, 1 in Tropical Development 1880- 
1913 W A Lewis, ed (Evanston:Northwestern University Press) 
pp 64-89.
Heerink, N (199?) Population Growth. Income Distribution and 
Economic Development: Theory, Methodology and Empirical Results. 
European University Institute Ph.D Dissertation.
IBRD (1992) Social Indicators of Development 91-92: Data on
Diskette. (Washington D.C.:World Bank).
IBRD (1991) Social Indicators of Development 1990 (Baltimore & 




























































































Londono, J L (1990) “Human Capital and Long Run Swings of Income 
Distribution,“ Harvard University manuscript.
Murphy, K ; Shleifer, A and Vishny, R (1991) "The Allocation of 
Talent: Implications for Growth,“ Quarterly Journal of Economics 
vol 106 pp 503-530.
Murphy, K ; Shleifer, A and Vishny R (1989) "Income Distribution, 
Market Size and Industrialization," Quarterly Journal of 
Economics vol 104 pp 537-64.
North, D C (1959) "Agriculture in Regional Economic Growth," 
Journal of Farm Economics vol 51 pp 943-951.
Ozler, S and Tabellini, G (1991) "External Debt and Political 
Instability," CEPR working paper No. 582.
Paukert, F (1973) "Income Distribution at Different Levels of 
Development," International Labour Review August September.
Persson, T and Tabellini, G (1991) "Is Inequality Harmful for 
Growth ? Theory and Evidence," NBER Working paper no 3599. 
and CEPR working paper # 581.
Rosenberg, N (1972) Technology and American Economic Growth (New 
York:M.E. Sharpe).
Summers, R and Heston A (1988) “A New Set of International 
Comparisons for Real Product and Price levels:Estimates for 130 
Countries," Review of Income and Wealth vol 34 pp 1-25.
Tilak, J (1989) "Rates of Return to Education and Income 





























































































Income Distribution Data for 54 Countries
% income share year of % income share year of
of top 5% survey of top 5% survey
BENIN 32 59 FRANCE 25 62
CHAD 23 58 GERMANY* 33.7 64
GABON 47 60 GREECE 23 57
IVORY COAST 29 59 ITALY 24.1 48
MADAGASCAR 37 60 NETHERLANDS 23.6 62
MOROCCO* 2 0 . 6 65 NORWAY 15.4 63
NIGER 23 60 SWEDEN 17.6 63
NIGERIA 38.4 59 UNITED KINGDOM 19 64
SENEGAL 36 60 BARBADOS 22.3 51
SIERRA LEONE 33.8 68 COSTA RICA 35 69
SOUTH AFRICA 39.4 65 EL SALVADOR 33 65
SUDAN 17.1 69 JAMAICA 30.2 58
TANZANIA 42.9 64 MEXICO 28.8 63
TUNES IA 22.4 71 PANAMA 34.5 69
ZAMBIA 37.5 59 TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 22.5 57
BURMA 28.2 58 UNITED STATES 14.8 69
INDIA 20 56 ARGENTINA 29.3 61
IRAQ 34 56 BOLIVIA 35.7 68
ISRAEL 1 1 . 2 57 BRAZIL 38.4 60
JAPAN 14.8 62 CHILE 2 2 . 6 68
KOREA 1 2 .5 66 COLOMBIA 40.4 64
MALAYSIA 17.8 57 ECUDAOR 24.6 68
PAKISTAN 20 63 PERU 48.3 61
PHILLI PINES 27.5 61 SURINAM 15.4 62
SRI LANKA 18.4 63 VENEZUELA 23.2 62
DENMARK 16.9 63 AUSTRALIA 14.4 66
FINLAND 21 62 FIJI 21.4 68
Source Paukert (1973)































































































Mean Standard Dev. Max. Min.
rich 26.60 9.28 48.3 11.2
Logrich 3.22 0.36 3.88 2.42
gr6085 1.99 1.84 5.95 -2.83
gr8085 -0.68 3.16 5.09 -8.98
gr6080 2.65 1.85 6.54 -1.89
lgdp60 0.37 0.91 2.00 -1.57
lgdp80 0.90 1.03 2.43 -1.04
gpop6085 2.02 0.95 4.29 0.29
gpop8085 2.05 1.53 9.85 -0.03
gpop6080 2.01 1.02 4.39 -0.42
slind65 21.21 12.27 46.48 0.98
slind80 22.87 10.53 40.46 1.63
slagr65 47.48 26.36 95.24 3.40
slagr80 37.93 26.51 91.08 2.60
prim60 0.79 0.31 1.44 0.05
prim7 0 0.88 0.29 1.64 0.14
sec60 0.25 0.22 0.86 0.003
sec70 0.38 0.27 1.00 0.01
geetot 0.045 0.015 0.077 0.014
sengsci65 21.84 14.76 100.00 0.00
sengsci80 25.32 9.00 46.52 10.01
inv 19.60 7.55 36.91 7.00
inv60 18.89 9.52 45.70 1.43
inv80 20.60 9.24 50.06 1.71
socsec 5.61 5.60 19.14 0.03
revcoup 0.22 0.28 1.15 0.00
riot 1.03 1.77 9.46 0.00
strike 0.19 0.33 1.54 0.00
ladens65 4.54 1.46 7.41 0.88
ladens80 4.80 1.39 7.67 1.11
rese 0.56 0.51 1 0
detex 1.44 0.88 2.73 0.19





























































































































Table III : Per-Capita GDP Growth 1960-85 and Income Inequality
1 2 3
# obs 52 52 52





























Investment % of GDP 
in 1960
4 5 6 7 8
52 52 52 52 52
0.32 0 .61 0 .60 0 . 42 0.36
4 . 06 -0 .76 — 0 . 58 3 .63 3 . 67
(2 .66) (2 .56) (2 .53) (2 .83) (2 . 60)
-0 .96 -0 .88 -0 .75 -0 . 84 -1 . 11
(0.70) (0 .59) (0 .61) (0 .72) (0 .69)
-1 .34 -2 .27 -2 .45 -1 . 64 -1 . 50
(0 .56) (0 .48) (0 .48) (0 .56) (0 -55)
-0 . 41 0.03 -0 .09 -0 .26 -0 .33
(0.34) (0 .32) (0.30) (0.33) (0 .33)
0. 11 0 .10 0.08 0 .13 0 .10




















beta/S -1.01 -0.94 -0.68 -0.60 -0.72 -0.60 -0.55 -0.72
test 1 0.35 1.58 1.84 1.46 1.65 1.70 1.41
test 2 -1.84 -1.64 -0.65 0.15 0.40 0.34 -0.87
Standard errors in parentheses. S is the standard error of the
regression. Description of Test statistics in text. For 




























































































Table IV : Per-Capita GDP Growth 1960-85 and Income Inequality
1 2 3 4 5
# observations 51 51 51 38 38





























































log of population 
per square Km '65
0.33
(0.18)






Social insurance & 
welfare % of GDP
-0.03
(0.06)
Beta/S -0.67 -0.37 -0.14 -1.21 -1.22
Test 1 2.36 2.97
Test 2 1.63 2.45
Standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is average 
percent growth rate of per capita real GDP from 1960 to 1985. 
Beta is the coefficient on Logrich. S is the standard error of 
the regression. Test 1 compares this coefficient with the 
coefficent of the simple regression. Test 2 compares this 
coefficient with the coefficient in column 1. For definitions of 





























































































Comparison of the Association between Inequality and 
GDP growth from 1960 to 1980 and from 1980 to 1985






































Standard errors in parentheses. t-statistics in square brackets. 
Coefficients of real per-capita GDP growth on the log of the 
income share of the richest 5% are reported. 1985/1980-1980/1960 
is the the growth rate of per capita GDP from 1980 to 1985 minus
the growth rate from 1960 to 1980. Other definitions and data
sources are described in the data appendix.
1. the regressions also include a constant
2. the regressions also include a constant the log of real per
capita GDP in 1960, the percent of workers employed in industry 
in 1965, and the growth rate of population from 1960 to 1985.
3. the regressions also include a constant the log of real per 
capita GDP in 1960, the percent of workers employed in industry 
in 1965, the growth rate of population from 1960 to 1985, and an 
indicator variable for member of OPEC.
4. the regressions also include a constant the log of real per 
capita GDP in 1960, the percent of workers employed in industry 
in 1965, the growth rate of population from 1960 to 1985, an 
indicator variable for member of OPEC, an indicator for African, 
and an indicator for Latin American.
5. the regressions also include a constant an indicator variable 






























































































Per-Capita GDP Growth 1980-85 and Income Inequality
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
# obs 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 51
R-Squared 0.26 0 .26 0.27 0 .28 0 .46 0 .29 0. 55 0 .41
Constant 13 .76 12 .95 12 .36 11 .78 3 .91 11 .15 12 .73 0 . 95
(3. 47) (4. 01) (4. 10) (4. 28) (4. 45) (4. 34) (3. 82) (5. 30)
logrich -4 .48 -4 .28 -3 .91 -3 .95 -3 .30 -3 .98 -3 . 84 -3 . 12
(1. 07) (1 .19) (1.28) (1 .30) (1 .19) (1 .30) (1.14) (1 .23
log(gdp80) 0 . 17 0.05 -0 .28 -2 . 81 -0 .65 -0 .90 2 .23
(0 .41) (0 .44) (0 .78) (0.95) (0 . 87) (0 .67) (1 .17
Population -0 .24 -0 . 18 0. 11 -0 .26 -0 . 65 -0 .38
Growth rate (0.31) (0-33) (0 .38) (0.34) (0 .28) (0.36
% Employment 0 .04 0 . 08 0.03 0 . 05





















Log Pop per 0.72
sq km '80 (0.31)
Beta/S -1.63 -1.55 -1.41 -1.41 -1.34 -1.42 -1.68 -1.16
Standard errors in parentheses. S is the standard error of the 






























































































Per-Capita GDP Growth 1980-85 and Income Inequality
1 2 3 4 5 6
# observations 52 52 52 18 18 18





















































Beta/S 1.63 -1.41 -0.72 -1.51 -0.80 -1.12
Test 1.83 1.42
Standard errors in parentheses. Beta is the coefficient on 
Logrich. S is the standard error of the regression. Test compares 
this coefficent to the coefficient in the simple regression. 
Dependent variable is average percent growth rate of per capita 
real GDP from 1980 to 1985. For definitions of variables and 





























































































Data Sources and Definitions
"Income Distribution and Economics Growth In a Cross Section of 
Countries,“ Waldmann, Robert J (1992)
This appendix is an edited version of Barro and Wolf (1989) which 
describes the data set used in Barro (1991).
The data are listed alphabetically.
B&W is the Data Appendix For Economic Growth In a Cross Section 
Of Countries, Barro, Robert J and Wolf Holger C (1989) . Used in 
Barro (1991) "Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries," 
Quarterly Journal of Economics vol CVI (May 1991).
HS88 is Heston A. and Summers R. (1988) "A New Set of 
International Comparisions of Real Product and Price Levels: 
Estimates for 130 Countries" ; The Review of Income and Wealth,
34, March 1988 , 1-25 (Dataset on Floppies) clncludes
Corrections for Brazil and Indonesia:»
HS91 is Heston A. and Summers R. (1991) "The Penn World Table 
(Mark V) An Expanded Set of International Comparisons, 1950-1985." 
data on diskette as described in the Quarterly Journal of 
Economics vol 106 pp 327-368.
SID is Social Indicators of Development data on diskette published 
by the World Bank.
B&S is Berg Andrew and Sachs Jeffrey (1988) "The Debt Crisis: 
Structural Explanations of Country Performance," Journal of 
Development Economics vol 29 pp 271-306.
Paukert Paukert, F (1973) "Income Distribution at Different Levels 
of Development," International Labour Review August September.
AFR is a dummy for Sub-Sahara Africa. The source is B&W
DETEX is the debt export ratio in 1981. The source is B & S
GEETOT is the average from 1970 to 1985 of the ratio
of nominal government expenditure on education to nominal GDP.
The source is B&W
GPOPxxyy is the growth rate of population from 19xx to 19yy.
The source is HS88 via B&W
GRxxyy is the growth rate of per capita GDP from 19xx to 19yy.
The source is HS88 via B&W
INV is the average from 1960 to 1985 of the ratio of
real domestic investment (private plus public) to real GDP in 




























































































INVxx is the ratio of real domestic investment (private pus 
public) to real GDP in percent. The Source is HS91.
LA is a dummy variable for Latin America. The source is B&W
LADENS is the natural logarithm of population per square kilometer 
of arable land. The source is SID
LGDPxx is the natural Logarithm of GDP per capita in real terms in 
19xx. The source is HS88 via B&W
LOGRICH is the natural Logarithm of income share of richest 5%.
The source is Paukert (1973).
OIL is a dummy for OPEC member. The source is B&W
POLRIGH is an index of political rights.(l=highest, 7=lowest).
The source is B&W
PRIMxx is the ratio of total students enrolled in primary 
education to estimated number of individuals in the age bracket 
6-11 years in 19xx. The source is B&W
RESC is a dummy variable indicating country rescheduled debt 
repayment during the period 1982-87. The source is B&S
REVCOUP is the number of revolutions and coups per year 
(1960-85).The source is B&W
RIOT is the number of Riots per year (1960 to 1985). The source 
is B&W
SECxx is the enrollment ratio for secondary education in 19xx . 
Constructed as ratio of total students enrolled in secondary 
education to estimated number of individuals in the age bracket 
12-17 years. The source is B&W
SLINDxx is the percent of employment in industry in 19xx. The 
source is SID.
SLAGRxx is the percent of employment in Agriculture in 19xx. The 
source is SID.
SOCSEC is the ratio of nominal social insurance and welfare 
payments to nominal GDP in percent. Average 1970 to 1985. The 
source is B&W.
STRATPR is the student teacher ratio in primary schools in 1960. 
The source is B&W
STRATSEC is the student teacher ratio in secondary schools in 
1960. The source is B&W
STRIKE is the number of policially motivated strikes per 
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